# Analysis of SCU and MCU effects in SRAM-based FPGAs

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Goal

- To present an automatic approach to identify, without simulations, sensitive bits of the configuration memory of SRAM-based FPGAs
  - Xilinx Virtex II and 4
  - Atmel AT40K and ATF280E



# Outline

- Introduction
- Static analysis
- Conclusions



# Introduction

- Two major questions are coming from designers:
  - How can I anticipate radiation-effects analysis?
    - Important to start thinking about radiation effects before prototypes are available
  - Millions of bit are inside the bitstream: how many of them are really sensitive?
    - Important to focus fault injection only on meaningful bits to save time, and to de-rate device cross-section to obtain design crosssection
  - The bit XYZ in the bitstream is leading the circuit to fail: which part of the design it refers to?
    - Important to debug the design quickly and accurately



# Our algorithm


- 1. Read the place & routed design and build the netlist/bitstream association
- 2. For each bit of the bitstream:
  - A. Flip the bit and update accordingly the netlist
  - B. Is the original netlist corrupted (the error arrives to outputs)?
    - I. Yes  $\rightarrow$  the bit is sensitive
    - II. No  $\rightarrow$  the bit is not sensitive
- Analysis is done looking at the error propagation path, and it does not consider workload




# An example: original circuit

The bitstream

The original netlist









# An example: sensitive bit

#### The bitstream

The corrupted netlist









# An example: sensitive bit

#### The bitstream

The corrupted netlist








# **Operational modes**

- Discovery mode: it analyzes the bitstream while neglecting mitigation schemes
  - Lists sensitive bits
- TMR mode: it analyzes the bitstream while automatically recognizing (X)TMR mitigation scheme
  - Lists bits that violate (X)TMR scheme (domain crossing events)
  - List bits that produce warnings (may lead to domain crossing events in case of accumulation)




# Domain crossing events



One Single Cell Upset (SCU) in the configuration memory provokes two circuit modifications in two TMR domains in the same TMR partition  $\rightarrow$  The faults propagate beyond the voter boundary



# Warnings




One SCU in the configuration memory provokes two circuit modifications in two voter partitions  $\rightarrow$  The faults stop at the voter boundary




# TMR-mode algorithm

- The algorithm recognizes automatically TMR domains, voters, and voter partitions
- Forward error propagation:
  - 1. Find all the paths from the fault site to the circuit outputs, or memory elements
  - 2. Is the fault propagating to only one of the voter inputs?
    - A. Yes  $\rightarrow$  the bit is not sensitive




B. No  $\rightarrow$  the fault propagates to at least two inputs of a voter in the same partition  $\rightarrow$  the bit is sensitive



# Why (X)TMR may fail?

Original netlist


SCU-corrupted netlist



 Dependability-oriented placement constraints and routing rules should be enforced to improve (X)TMR robustness



# The Flow





# The report

Detailed report is produced for Xilinx devices


```
Resource: PIP Block Adr 0 Maj Add 6 Min Add 14 Bit 156
Involved PIP : Y1 -- S2BEG2
FAR: 0x000c1c00 Bit: 156
Net = data_bus_IBUF_TR
```

- Less detailed report is produced for Atmel devices (work in progress to improve it)
  - Addresses of sensitive bits
  - Sensitive resources
  - Name of the corresponding design module



# Supported fault models

- Single Cell Upset (SCU)
- Multiple Cell Upset (MCU)
  - Growing phenomena at each new generation of devices
  - STAR includes layout information about the analyzed device (Virtex II, only)
- Accumulated SCU



#### Possible use cases

- Circuit debug: the name of the EDIF resources corresponding to sensitive bits can be exploited for this purpose
- Fault injection: the addresses of sensitive bits can be exploited for this purpose
- Radiation testing: the above data can be used during post-processing of radiation testing results



# A few figures


- STAR discovery mode, SCU analysis
  - Design: leon3mp (2,933 PIPs; 10,470 CLBs)
  - Device: xc2v6000
  - Machine: HP hw8400 (Xeon 3 GHz, 8GB RAM)
- Summary of results:
  - 2,107,285 sensitive bits (621,818 programmed; 1,485,467 not programmed)
    - PIP-related bits: 1,672,504
    - CLB-related bits: 434,781

CPU time: 530 sec




# A few figures

#### MCU analysis for a benchmark circuit





# Roadmap





# Factsheet

- STAR/Susanna coded in C/C++, run on Windows/ Unix/Linux
- STAR
  - Supports Virtex II/IIpro/4
  - Seamless integration with fault injection tool (FLIPPER and FT-UNSHADES)
- Susanna
  - Supports AT40K/ATF280E



# Conclusions

- Automatic solutions are available for investigating upsets in the configuration memory of SRAM-based FPGAs
- Support available for Xilinx Virtex II/4 devices, and Atmel AT40K/ATF2780E devices
- Seamless integration with fault injection is available
- Seamless integration with automatic tools for design mitigation
  - VPLACE/RoRA  $\rightarrow$  see next presentation



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